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Abstract 
While transforming the investment, trading and infrastructural landscape in Africa, Chinese 
firms are also generating much-publicised controversy about their real motives. Many of the 
large Chinese firms operating in Africa focus mostly but not exclusively on engineering, 
infrastructural projects and mining. This Africa-China engagement has only recently begun to 
receive critical attention in the area of management and organisation studies. With reference 
to Kenya, we found that this phenomenon is characterised by four key themes: the unique yet 
diverse motivations of investors, the challenge of reconciling cross-cultural differences, the 
impact of low-cost strategies, and the boundary-spanning role of managers. This paper also 
considers the extent to which post-colonial theory might serve as an analytical lens for 
examining the perceptions and attitudes of Chinese managers as well as the experiences of 
the Africans who work for them.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, China has emerged as Africa’s most important trading partner. While 
statistics differ depending on what sources one reads, the consensus is that in the last ten to 
fifteen years, Chinese investments into Africa have grown at an astronomical rate. As Gu 
(2009) points out, it is not the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into Africa 
that is remarkable but the speed of growth. From the mid-1990s, China-Africa trade doubled 
every three years, and is expected to grow by 70% from 2009 to $300 billion by 2015 
(McMahon, 2011). This followed a shift in policy away from Maoist propaganda to Deng 
Xiaoping ‘socialist modernisation’ which demanded trade and investment for economic gains 
(Taylor, 1998). In 2002, trade value between China and Kenya was US$186.37 million 
(Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2006). By 2011, when China became Kenya’s second biggest 
trading partner, trade had risen from US$18.25 billion in 2010 to US$24.28 billion, and from 
January to July 2013, the figure was US$17.3 billion, and continues to grow (State Council 
Information Office, 2013). The Africa-China phenomenon has attracted the attention of 
economists and international relations scholars, but is only now beginning to attract the 
attention of organisation theory and management researchers.  
          Academic attention and media interest have both tended to focus on the controversial 
nature of Chinese investments, with China often being viewed as a new colonising power 
with an insatiable appetite for Africa’s resources. The leading recipients of Chinese FDI are 
resource-rich countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria, Sudan, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Cheng and Liang, 2011). Furthermore, Africa has previously 
played a key role in supporting China’s quest for soft power (Snow, 1988). Thus, observers 
contend that China’s involvement in Africa is politically motivated (Gill and Reilly, 2007), 
and lopsided, favouring the much more politically and economically powerful China (e.g. 
Foster et al., 2008; Kamoche, 2011). The need for caution is supported by recent research 
which demonstrates that Chinese competition is a credible threat to emerging market low-
wage exporters of labour-intensive consumer goods (Eichengreen and Tong, 2006), which 
has implications for Africa.   
         With the declining monopoly of the West over Africa’s economy, other emerging 
markets like China will play a decisive part in shaping the future of the continent (Kragelund, 
2009). Indeed, the increase in Chinese outward FDI in the past two decades amounts to a 
challenge of the West’s hegemony in Africa (Jackson, 2012). Chinese firms operating in 
Africa appear to be guided by the principle of ‘disruptive innovation’ by investing in a 
geographical region that is relatively unattractive to western firms (see Hart and Christensen, 
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2002). African countries have been urged to learn from their experience with the West and to 
position themselves as equal partners while dealing with emergent economic players such as 
India and China (Broadman, 2007). Some observers have noted the prevalence of 
questionable employment practices and failure to protect workers’ rights and safeguard jobs 
(e.g. Opondo, 2009). Others have characterised China’s interest in Africa as the new 
scramble for Africa, with Africa becoming the new arena for a struggle for resources and 
markets, thus raising serious doubts about the real benefits for Africa (Southall and Melber, 
2009; Taylor, 2006). We seek to enhance the understanding of the nature and dynamics of 
Chinese investments in Africa, to characterise the motives of a diversity of investors, analyse 
their human resource strategies, and to scrutinise the experiences of both the Chinese 
employers and African personnel (both managers and employees).   
          Much of the current work on Chinese investments in Africa has focused on large 
Chinese State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) which enjoy extensive State-funding and other 
forms of support, and tend to be associated with large infrastructural works and mining (e.g. 
Fung and Garcia-Herrero, 2012). We believe these firms constitute an important proportion 
of the entire China-in-Africa landscape, yet they only tell part of the story. Therefore, we 
consider a wider range of investments, including privately-owned firms in the 
telecommunication, construction and manufacturing sectors, a good number of which are 
large conglomerates, and small proprietorships such as catering and service firms. Noting that 
African voices are still ‘weak’ in the context of imposed Western management knowledge, 
Jackson’s (2012: 182) critique poses the question: ‘Is China’s engagement with African 
countries likely to make a difference?’ In response to this query, we begin by acknowledging 
that the postcolonial critique has important implications for the emergent Africa-China 
engagement on a number of levels, which in turn constitute our three key research questions:  
           First, we ask whether it is plausible to consider China as a homogenous entity with a 
unified strategy for Africa, with specific reference to Kenya. This assumption, which has 
engendered the view that ‘China’ is preoccupied with securing resources, has prevented a 
more nuanced debate about the nature and scope of these investments. In particular there is 
little understanding about the cross-cultural, human resource, employment and expatriation 
issues that pertain to the Afro-China engagement. Second, given the controversy surrounding 
China’s motives in investing in Africa, this research ponders the extent to which the 
involvement of Chinese firms in Kenya can be described as exhibiting neo-colonial 
characteristics, thus inviting a post-colonial analytical approach. In particular we ask: in the 
context of China’s historical relationship with Africa, how relevant is the post-colonial 
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critique in shedding light on the emergent relationship? Third, we consider whether the 
Chinese involvement in Kenya continues the apparent Western tendency to denigrate African 
local/indigenous knowledge and the concomitant pursuit of ethnocentric practices. 
Specifically, we ask: to what extent are Chinese organisations drawing from local knowledge 
in navigating the local investment landscape? To do so, we examine the experiences and 
attitudes of Chinese managers/investors, Kenyan managers/employees and policy-makers, as 
well as the management practices of Chinese firms, an empirical approach that has not been 
pursued sufficiently in contemporary Africa-China research. We recognise that there are 
multiple voices and narratives within this space, some dominant, others passive.   
          To achieve the above objectives, we conducted in-depth interviews in both Chinese 
SOEs and private companies operating in Kenya as an initial step toward a more extensive 
analysis of Africa-China business relations. Our findings help to shed light both on the 
challenges Chinese firms are facing and the mutual expectations of the African work force 
and Chinese employers and how these are negotiated, as well as the opportunities this 
engagement offers to further theory development and to the formulation of a more sustainable 
socio-economic engagement. In the sections that follow, we characterise African 
management research and locate the emergent Africa-China dialogue in context, re-examine 
the thrust of post-colonial theory, discuss our research findings and offer some directions for 
further research.   
 
Management research in Africa  
Following prior concerns about the dearth of research and about the appropriateness of 
Western management practices (e.g. Blunt and Jones, 1992; Kamoche, 2002), there has been 
a growing body of research on the management of people and organisations in Africa. An 
exhaustive review of the scope of this corpus of knowledge would require a full paper. Thus, 
this section aims to provide a flavour of the research context within which we are locating the 
Africa-China question. Researchers querying the scope to develop contextually valid 
management practices have begun to look at traditional cultural values and African 
philosophy, such as Ubuntu, the basic humaneness, spirit of community, and oneness that 
defines African social relations (Mangaliso, 2001). The emergent corpus of knowledge 
includes some notable books, such as Kamoche, Debrah, Horwitz, and Muuka (2004a) which 
offers detailed analyses of the theory and practice of human resources at the national level; 
Newenham-Kahindi, Kamoche, Chizema and Mellahi (2013), which characterises some of 
the latest research on the continent; and Jackson (2004), which focuses on the management 
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challenge in a culturally diverse continent. A number of special issues on Africa have 
appeared in the International Journal of Human Resource Management (Kamoche et al., 
2012), the Journal of World Business (Kamoche, 2011), and the Journal of Occupational and 
Organizational Psychology (Walumbwa et al., 2011).  
          The scope of the emergent recent literature is broad and comprehensive, as typified in the 
following examples. Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah (2011) analysed the dynamics of 
employees’ inter-firm mobility in the airline industry in Africa. Horwitz (2012) considered 
the emergent HR practices of Southern African firms in the context of a significant presence 
of Asian MNCs. Jackson et al. (2008) examined the importance of multiple cultural 
influences in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Kenya. Kamoche and Newenham-
Kahindi (2012) examined the knowledge appropriation approaches of two multinational firms 
in Tanzania. Idiagbon-Oke and Oke (2011) investigated the change implications and 
effectiveness of implementing flexible work practices in local firms in Nigeria. Okpara and 
Kabongo (2011) examined the impact of cross-cultural training on expatriate adjustment in an 
African context. Lituchy et al (2013) considered leadership in Uganda and three non-African 
countries. Wood et al (2011) examined the relationship between HRM in Mozambique and 
business systems theory. Gomez et al. (2012) discussed human resource practices in the 
mergers and acquisition process in the Nigerian banking sector. Much of this work focuses on 
characterising the emergent practices in context, advancing theory and demonstrating how 
mainstream theory might be enriched by an analysis of the African experience.  
           Specifically relating to Chinese firms, common themes include trends in investments 
and trade, the political-economic debates about the benefits of Chinese FDI, debunking 
‘myths’ of Chinese dominance, the role of Chinese soft power, how Africans view the Africa-
China phenomenon, and so forth (e.g. Fijalkowski, 2011; He, 2013; Hanusch, 2012; Jenkins 
and Edwards, 2006). Some authors suggest that Chinese engagement is driven by resource-
dependence on energy and mineral security (Kurlantzick, 2006; Gill et al., 2007) while 
playing on Africa’s ‘historic suspicions’ of western intentions (Taylor, 2006). Yet, others 
posit the counter-argument that Chinese authorities speak of engaging on the basis of 
cooperation and friendship (Thiam and Mulira, 1999; Shaw et al., 2007; Jackson 2012). 
Brautigam and Tang (2011) have observed that the almost exclusive concern with natural 
resources has led some to view this engagement as neo-colonial, and benefiting ‘African 
elites’ (Kopinski et al., 2011). Others claim that China’s current motivation for involvement 
in Africa has not changed over the decades, and that Chinese firms have no automatic 
preference for Chinese labour and do so where there are genuine shortages for example in aid 
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projects (e.g. Davies et al., 2008). With specific reference to Kenya, Gadzala (2009) found 
that the benefits of Chinese investments have been exaggerated, in particular by policy and 
government leaders, and that while Chinese firms have led to some modest job creation and 
infrastructural improvements, they have negatively impacted Kenya’s informal sector. In a 
continent-wide survey, Hanusch (2012) found that while China is not perceived very 
differently from other major (Western) powers, Chinese imports are perceived as damaging 
local economies. Moving closer to the organisational context, Opondo (2009) found 
extensive evidence of employment law violations including sexual abuse in Chinese textile 
firms in Kenya, which underscores the need for social responsibility (Cheng and Liang, 2011). 
Akorsu and Cooke (2011) investigated Chinese and Indian firms investing in Ghana in 
relation to the national labour laws and international labour standards. Very little of this 
emergent literature has offered the voices of Chinese investors and the Africans who work for 
them. We believe there is a need to go beyond the macro-economic, trade and political-
economic debates and engage more closely with the Chinese investors and African 
employees within the context of work and the employment relationship. We propose to 
pursue such a pathway through post-colonial theory which we now turn to. 
  
Post-colonial and neo-colonial theory 
Whilst multinational corporations (MNCs) have increasingly demonstrated the capacity to 
adopt appropriate management practices and to respond to the exigencies of the institutional 
context, there remain concerns about ethnocentricity, the attitudes exhibited by foreign 
managers, hence some marginalisation of local knowledge. While theories to explain this 
phenomenon abound, we find the emerging interest in post-colonial theory particularly 
appropriate in the African context. For example, Nkomo (2011) offers a postcolonial and 
anti-colonial interpretation of representations of ‘African’ leadership. Yousfi (2013) draws 
from the post-colonial discourse on hybridity to explain how Tunisian managers modernised 
management through American methods. Jackson (2012) and Jackson et al. (2013) suggest 
that both post-colonial and dependency theory help explain the prevailing pejorative portrayal 
of African local or indigenous knowledge. Hence, the marginalisation of local knowledge, 
and the derogatory portrayal of Africa and African workers can be attributed to historical 
circumstances in which the dominant Western colonial powers imposed not only a political 
structure rooted in Western liberal democratic values but also a modernising management 
paradigm (Jackson, 2012).  
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        This ethos has been identified in research that seeks to identify management practices 
that are not only contextually valid but which give voice to the African organisational actors 
(e.g. Blunt and Jones, 1992; Kamoche et al, 2004a). The term postcolonial refers to ‘a period 
coming after the end of colonialism’ (Childs and Williams, 1996:1). In political terms, it 
signifies the dismantling of structures of colonial control which characterised the 1950s/60s 
subsequent to which independence became a reality for many countries (Darwin, 1991). The 
‘period after colonialism’ is of course a much broader historical phenomenon which spans 
much of the world, from Africa to the Americas and Asia, with European countries playing 
the role of colonising powers. The definitive feature of colonialism is the way it ‘linked the 
West and its colonies in a complex structure of unequal exchange and industrialisation that 
made the colonies economically dependent upon Western colonial nations’ (Prasad, 2003:5). 
Post-colonialism thus constitutes a radical critique of this historical enterprise.   
           Adam and Tiffin (1991) identify three forms of post-colonialism: the first considers 
countries/regions formerly under European rule; the second is conceived of as discursive 
practices, including resistance to colonialism and colonialist ideologies; the third strand refers 
to the persistence of colonialism, and the idea that Western powers are still intent on securing 
control over the former colonies. It is this mix of political, cultural and economic hegemony 
which has come to be associated with neo-colonialism (see also Childs and Williams, 1991). 
It is not surprising that various scholars within the post-colonial discourse see contemporary 
globalisation in Marxian terms as a new form of ‘imperialism’. This argument is driven by 
the Mark-Engels view of capitalist intervention in the colonies as a quest for market 
expansion for goods and low labour costs (see Wallerstein, 1983). The post-colonial world 
can be characterised as ‘paradoxical in-betweenness’ (Spivak, 1990: 166) to signify a form of 
limbo in which a State might find itself, having overthrown the yoke of political colonialism 
but finding socio-economic independence elusive. Thus, African countries find they are 
endowed with vast resources, yet are unable to realise industrial and economic progress. 
China’s entry creates a potentially mutually symbiotic relationship.  
             However, doubt has been raised about the extent to which African countries are 
benefitting from this engagement (e.g. Foster et al., 2008), hence leading to the suggestion 
that China’s involvement in Africa is one of unequal partners, with the dominant party 
seeking a form of ‘imperialist’ control, where such domination might be characterised as the 
exercise of economic and political power without direct occupation (Prasad, 2003). By a 
similar token, Blunt and Jones (1997: 6) identify ‘imperialist’ tendencies amongst western 
firms in East Asia and Africa, in the form of domination resulting ‘from an unequal 
8 
 
distribution of power, usually associated with economic and technological superiority.’ 
Whether Chinese firms are seeking ‘imperialist control’ or not is beyond the scope of our 
analysis; but we believe it is necessary to highlight the theoretical, management and policy 
implications of any apparent ‘domination’. The fact that China’s political-economy has been 
founded in a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist tradition that is fundamentally anti-capitalist and anti-
colonialist (Young, 2001) provides us a unique opportunity to examine how such a historical 
background can be reconciled with an economic agenda and investment strategies that appear 
neo-colonial in character. Media pronouncements by Chinese authorities show China as 
particularly sensitive about suggestions of colonialism, and keen to emphasise ‘partnership 
for mutual benefit’. Yet, various scholars (e.g. Kopinski et al., 2011) argue that these benefits 
do not reach ordinary Africans.  
           Some authors have suggested that post-colonial theory may not be appropriate for 
conceptualising the current geopolitical dynamics of China in Africa because there is not a 
post-colonial relationship between the two (see Jackson, 2012) and that the relationship was 
in fact built on an anti-colonial discourse in which China played a key role in supporting 
independence movements in countries such as Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia 
(Snow, 1988). Hence, we consider the relevance of post-colonial theory with respect to 
Chinese managers’ representation of ‘otherness’ (Bhabha, 1994) in their African personnel. 
Post-colonial theory proposes that the developing world is represented in the eyes of the 
developed world (Said 1978; 1995). The colonised are subjected to a questionable 
representation of ‘otherness’ yet are knowable, often via stultifying stereotypes and phobia 
(Bhabha, 1994). Thus, the former colony comes to see itself as under-developed, backward, 
needing help (in the form of aid and loans), and incapable of standing on its own feet, or 
exploiting its own natural resources. 
          More importantly for our purposes, the developing African country comes to view its 
own culture, values, knowledge and management practices as inferior to those of the 
colonising power, or in this case, the foreign investor. This perception of ‘backwardness’ 
ultimately legitimises the use of ethnocentric management practices. Ethnocentricity is 
defined as the tendency to view the world from the vantage point of one’s own particular 
cultural or social group (Johnson et al., 2006). This view leads to overestimating the 
importance and worth of people in one’s own group. An ethnocentric management approach 
may lead to the paradoxical position of local executives who identify the negative impact of 
ethnocentricity but feel powerless to act on it, thus failing to resist the dominance of the neo-
colonial power. Moreover, foreign investors may disregard local knowledge, or consider local 
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skills as inadequate and inappropriate for their advanced technology and insist on bringing 
their own workers in addition to expatriate managers. 
         In the transfer of management practices, ethnocentricity may become self-perpetuating, 
and the local knowledge possessed by local managers and that can be utilised to achieve 
better firm performance may be neglected. Thus, ethnocentricity may not only create 
frustration for local managers but can also become a barrier to firm performance. Yet, 
resistance to the dominance of the unequal partner is considered a vital aspect of post-
colonial thinking (Childs and Williams, 1996). We argue therefore, that where ethnocentric 
practices with a neo-colonial character are resisted or questioned, we can infer a post-colonial 
ethos in unravelling the nature of the business relationship irrespective of the pre-existence of 
a colonial political one.  
 
Methodology  
A qualitative approach 
With respect to Africa-China relations, Jackson (2012) argues that the sheer lack of empirical 
data requires in-depth interrogations of China’s motives at the organisational level, as well as 
the cultural influences. In order to gain as complete a picture as we could about the nature 
and scope of the phenomenon in question, we opted for a qualitative methodology embracing 
several approaches that we felt would best capture the realities and ‘stories’ of the social 
actors. Given the complexity of the phenomenon in question which potentially lent itself to 
multiple interpretations, we were guided by a key question: ‘what’s the main story here?’ 
(Strauss, 1987). Gaining an in-depth understanding (Hollis, 1994), i.e. deep knowledge of an 
unravelling phenomenon as opposed to a static snap-shot at a point in time (Ragin, 1994) was 
a defining feature of this undertaking.  
         Following Schofield (1993) we took the view that this work would be valued for its 
‘intrinsic interest’ as well as for the substantial and novel insights it would generate with a 
view to contributing to theory-building. In line with Dyer and Wilkins (1991) and Yin (1994), 
we sought to contribute to theory-building through an analytical approach that allowed the 
social actors to tell their own stories, unfettered by any preconceived notions the researchers 
might have harboured. Qualitative approaches have proven to be appropriate for researching 
comparable phenomena in the African context (e.g. Jackson et al., 2008; Opondo, 2009; 
Idiagbon-Oke and Oke, 2011). To achieve our research objectives, it was necessary to talk to 
both the Chinese investors/employers as well as the Africans who work for them. This is in 
contrast to much extant Africa-China research which has relied on secondary data, 
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economic/trade statistics and survey data (e.g. Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013). We 
encountered substantial challenges in negotiating access with firms that were not only 
unaccustomed to academic research but had also become extremely circumspect about 
perceived ‘harassment’ by local bureaucrats and government officials in the guise of ensuring 
compliance with local laws.  
 
Data collection and analysis   
The interviews were conducted by both authors, a Kenyan and a Chinese, each with a deep 
understanding of their respective country, on separate occasions during a three year period 
from 2011 to 2014. We conducted 71 interviews with 62 people (n=62): 30 Kenyan, 31 
Chinese, and 1 Nigerian. The details are summarised in Table 1. Seven people were 
interviewed more than once on subsequent visits. A total of 29 (n=29) Chinese organisations 
were covered, in sectors ranging from engineering, mining and construction, manufacturing, 
trading, media, catering outlets, to non-profit, and travel. Most were privately-owned, and 
would not disclose details such as size, ownership and business performance. They ranged 
from large conglomerates to small and medium-sized firms. We also interviewed a range of 
stakeholders who had some interest in the subject, including five Kenyan entrepreneurs who 
had business dealings with Chinese firms, one lawyer who had a large number of Chinese 
clients, and four senior Kenyan public officials.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
            We maintained contact with some of the interviewees and followed up with 
interviews on subsequent visits, and through telephone conversations, thus helping to fill gaps, 
enhance our knowledge of an unfolding phenomenon, and double-check our 
findings/interpretations as the interviewees were unable to devote time to review the 
transcripts. Over time, the project began to assume the character of a longitudinal study. 
Access varied from firm to firm, and while we sought to interview at least one person in each 
firm, we managed to interview at least a Kenyan and a Chinese in each firm. In some cases 
there were two to three interviewees and as many as eight (five Chinese and three Kenyans) 
in one conglomerate. Some Chinese managers did not permit access to Kenyan staff, while in 
some cases we managed to speak to Kenyans but Chinese declined to participate. This did not 
pose a serious problem as our purpose was not to juxtapose the views of the respective parties. 
We began the initial search by consulting records of Chinese firms from relevant government 
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departments, the Chinese embassy in Nairobi, and through personal contacts. In the majority 
of cases, the Chinese declined to participate, offering a variety of reasons, including time 
pressure and suspicion about the real purpose of the research.  
             Some of this mistrust has been attributed to cultural issues: Chinese have 
apprehension about talking to ‘outsiders’ (Siebers, 2011), as well as perceived ‘harassment’ 
by bureaucrats and law enforcement officials searching for illegal workers and inspecting 
trading licenses. The challenges of conducting research in an African context (Kamoche et al, 
2004a) were compounded further by the subject matter, requiring us to exercise even more 
resourcefulness. Therefore, out of the 71 interviews, we conducted 53 (75%) ourselves and 
the other 18 (25%) were conducted by a research firm (eight Kenyan and 10 Chinese). The 
firm in question was given a very detailed brief with specific questions identical to the ones 
we ourselves asked. They were asked to interview 10 Chinese and 10 Africans; 18 were 
usable. After we jointly identified and agreed the sample, we independently confirmed the 
identity of the contacts, vetted and trained the interviewers, and verified the digital recordings.  
          While asking very specific questions, we relied on open-ended semi-structured 
interviews (Gillham, 2000), in which the interviewees were allowed to speak freely, 
prompted with appropriate probing questions. Kenyan employees and supervisory personnel 
were asked about their motives for and experience of working for a Chinese company, and 
their perceptions of Chinese business practices. Chinese investors were asked about their 
motives for investing in Kenya, the support and challenges they have gained and faced 
respectively, their perceptions of the Kenyan workforce, and how they deal with human 
resource and cross-cultural issues at the workplace. Other Kenyan interviewees, such as 
entrepreneurs, media and legal personnel were asked questions about their relations with 
Chinese organisations, and their observations of the public perceptions of the Africa-China 
phenomenon. Public officials were asked about the official policy on Chinese investments, 
the State’s view on the controversy surrounding these investments and what they saw as the 
future of this engagement.     
           The majority of the interviews with the Chinese were conducted in Mandarin; those 
with Kenyans were conducted in English. While all the interviews relied on detailed note-
taking, half of the interviewees agreed to be digitally recorded. Further notes and reflections 
were prepared immediately after each interview in order to benefit from fresh memory 
(Whyte, 1994). Following Jackson et al. (2008), all sets of notes were carefully compared for 
consistency and reliability, and irrelevant content deleted. The recorded interviews were 
transcribed and those in Chinese translated by a professional translator/transcriptionist, and 
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subsequently checked for consistency against the original recording by the Mandarin-
speaking author and an independent third party. Making sense of the extensive amount of 
data involved an approach consistent with narrative analysis and interpretation (Gabriel, 2000; 
Pinnington et al., 2009) at the level of the social actor’s individual’s experience, and with 
reference to a diversity of organisational forms. The transcribed responses were checked 
against the recordings and field notes by both speakers in the respective language, coded 
according to topic and subjected to a series of iterations until specific themes and stories 
began to emerge. These themes and stories were corroborated against each other and double-
checked against the field notes, thus ensuring the integrity of the data. Follow up contact with 
interviewees also helped ensure validity of interpretation. Our analysis was guided by 
replication rather than sampling logic (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994), 
and aimed to critique and extend existing theory rather than to test it. We constantly re-
examined the transcripts in the light of the emergent themes and new interpretations to seek 
both verification and contradiction (see Richards and Richards, 1994).   
 
Findings 
Our analysis generated four key themes which we discuss below under the following sub-
titles: the diverse drivers of Chinese investments, the challenge of reconciling cross-cultural 
differences, the impact of low-cost strategies on the management of human resources, and the 
boundary-spanning role of local managers. Taken together, these themes characterise the 
nature of Chinese investments in Kenya and have important implications for Africa-China 
business relations in general and our research questions in particular. 
Drivers of Chinese investments and motivation to remain  
In examining the motives for investing in Kenya, we sought to interrogate the general 
perception that Chinese firms are engaged in a State-sponsored strategy to secure domination 
over African markets. While this reasoning might apply to some of the large State-owned 
firms that have been winning tenders in major infrastructural and mining ventures, the reality 
for private firms and SMEs is much more nuanced. This project revealed that although the 
number of Chinese investments is small in relative terms as compared to western firms, there 
has been a steady stream of Chinese investors into Kenya over the years, with the Chairman 
of the China Kenya Association (CN14, Director, Conglomerate) himself having started his 
businesses thirty years ago. 
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         While resource-seeking largely explains the behaviour of large SOEs, the entry of 
private firms and SMEs can be categorised into two: (a) those who deliberately sought 
international opportunities out of genuine concerns about the viability of the Chinese 
domestic market, and (b) those who ended up investing in Kenya as a result of a combination 
of opportunism and serendipity without a grand investment strategy. Both categories often 
made the decision to invest and live in Kenya in the face of strong opposition from friends 
and family. Many of these individuals report being attracted to the mild climate, fresh air and 
relatively well-managed ecosystem (an obvious comparison with major industrial Chinese 
cities), the friendliness of the local population and the relatively stable political climate. 
Challenges for the Chinese firms included: insecurity, poor infrastructure, fluctuating 
exchange rates and perceptions of the lack of a highly-committed and competent labour force. 
The comment below typifies the case of investors who were driven by concerns about China. 
 
I came to Kenya because I was not sure what the economic reforms in 
China would bring us and I have stayed and lived here for three decades 
because I thought I had already come here and I must persist in my work 
here and I have been here for more than 30 years … (CN14, Director, 
Conglomerate).  
 
In an analysis of the internationalisation of Chinese firms, Child and Rodrigues (2004) 
argue that Chinese firms seek competitive advantages in new markets instead of exploiting 
competitive advantages in the domestic market, which they achieve by seeking technological 
and brand assets. Our findings echo Boisot and Meyer’s (2008) view that the 
internationalisation of many Chinese firms presents strategic exit rather than strategic entry 
into foreign markets. The opportunistic investors present an equally interesting picture: 
 
I ran a business in Kuwait before, so I had some experience of living abroad, 
but coming to Kenya was a big challenge. I got the idea from a friend who 
was working here, but many friends and family couldn’t understand why I 
wanted to come here. So I had to work very hard to prove myself (CN2, 
Entrepreneur, Catering). 
 
I was going to England to study but my brother told me that there were good 
opportunities in Kenya and I came to help him. By now, we have worked 
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here for twenty years and we run large businesses across various sectors 
(CN15, Director, Conglomerate). 
 
Many who had misgivings soon found the country very accommodating. (CN24, 
Deputy General Manager, SOE, Construction) found the country ‘was not as bad as I’d 
imagined.’ For the majority of Chinese managers/investors living without family, 
adjustment/adaptability is a major challenge, necessitating home return once or twice a year. 
The high cost involved in part explains why Chinese expatriates are kept to a minimum and 
why the claims of importing vast numbers of Chinese labourers do not ring true. Doing 
business in Africa was, in the main, less stressful than many previously imagined. Ironically, 
some saw benefits in potentially problematic areas as in the surprising confession below: 
 
… Corruption is beneficial to us. Take a simple example of processing 
immigration documents. Give the local official a small tip, and he’ll settle it 
for me … it’s more serious in China. Indeed they ask for less money here 
(CN24, Deputy General Manager, SOE, Construction). 
 
The manager reported that officials were happy to accept bribes but insisted their 
company followed regulations in bidding for projects. The scope and effect of corruption is a 
matter of perception and personal experience, as other managers reported that at least at the 
level of petty officials, corruption in Kenya was ‘worse’ than in China. As for those who are 
deployed as expatriates, especially by SOEs, the element of choice is absent, but they too had 
little difficulty in adapting. 
 
… Since we are employed, and deployed by the company, we have no choice 
where we want to go. But after coming to Kenya, I feel that Kenya’s climate 
is good, the people are friendly … and the entire political situation is stable, 
and I’ve made a lot of local friends (CN18, Chairman, SOE, Construction). 
 
I came to Kenya as a General Manager sent by our company’s 
Headquarters back in China. I was responsible for our US market before. 
Our company has been operating in Kenya for thirty years and surely we 
will strengthen our development in this rapidly growing market (CN26, 
Managing Director, SOE, Construction).  
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An executive (CN24, Deputy General Manager, Construction) at a SOE involved in 
infrastructural construction reported that the company first got involved in Kenya by 
participating in a World Bank funded financial aid project, and then chose to stay on to 
pursue other commercial projects. This company also reported that Kenya provided various 
forms of incentives in the early days but as competition intensified, these dried up. Virtually 
all the firms reported that they received no preferential treatment, and most lamented that this 
compared unfavourably with the tax breaks afforded to foreign firms in China. Yet, this did 
not present a serious disadvantage, nor did the challenges noted above particularly alienate 
Chinese investors. The comment below exemplifies the common view about wanting to be a 
part of Kenya’s/Africa’s economic rejuvenation, and acknowledging the continent’s potential:   
 
Kenya is our home. We are proud of our own country China’s development 
and we appreciate how China has been growing into a big economy. We 
hope Kenyans will do the same for their country and we are here to help 
them to do it as well. We hope Kenya will have a strong financial basis and 
good prospect in future (CN29, Marketing Executive, Pharmaceuticals).  
 
The foregoing challenges the conception of a homogenous China, and demonstrates 
that the motives of Chinese firms’ engagement in Kenya are not limited to asset and resource 
seeking (Kurlandtzick, 2006; Gill, et al., 2007; Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013). While Li et 
al (2013) have found that the Chinese acted to represent the interests of firms in the natural 
resource sector, our findings are consistent with Brautigan and Tang (2011) who found that 
the Chinese government’s role in creating special economic zones in Africa was limited to 
the initial diplomatic deliberations, after which the companies became the main actors. 
 
The challenge of reconciling cross-cultural differences 
This theme captures the difficulties individuals in both communities perceived through their 
joint interaction. We sought to understand the basis of the stereotypes and misconceptions, 
and the effect these had on workplace relations. The general perceptions Kenyans harboured 
ranged from suspicions about Chinese wanting to ‘take over Africa’, hiring large numbers of 
Chinese workers, using Chinese prisoners on construction sites to keep costs down and 
under-cut rivals, to the more positive perception of Chinese managers as caring and 
understanding. The latter view was based on the assumption that managers from a developing 
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country like China have empathy with the day-to-day problems faced by low-wage workers. 
However, there were issues of communication and language skills which may have caused 
misunderstanding.  
 
Chinese understand African workers' problems but should learn English for 
better integration (KN2, Business Supervisor, Catering).  
 
They are good. They’re kind-hearted, but not all … [compared to Indians] 
who have a bad perception of Africans (KN16, Office Coordinator, 
Conglomerate). 
 
Everything is kept very simple. They don’t even advertise at all, even on 
billboards, TV, radio, etc. It’s ignorance. (KN2, Business Supervisor, 
Catering). 
 
They don’t speak much English but train themselves on the job. It can be a 
problem (KN17, Sales Manager, Conglomerate). 
 
Some of them have a tendency of being quite rude, and speaking very loudly. 
I don’t know if it’s a tactic to intimidate, and some can really scare you. But 
you get used to it and learn to adjust. The first two months I was asking 
myself why I’m working here, but got used to brushing it off (KN18, Travel 
Consultant, Conglomerate). 
   
We sometimes have this problem in the office – after lunch, the Chinese take 
a nap. Kenyans might think that’s the time to play music loudly (KN20, 
Deputy General Manager, High-tech firm). 
 
Not surprisingly, Chinese managers held mixed views about Kenyan personnel (both 
workers and managers). However, while they generally expressed satisfaction with managers 
whom they considered essential as discussed in a section below, the consensus about workers 
was mostly negative. The selected quotes below illustrate this: 
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The country has lots of blessings but people take these for granted, they give 
up easily (CN14, Chairman, Conglomerate). 
  
HR in Kenya is very good compared to neighbouring countries. Kenyans 
are very hard-working (CN21, CEO, High-tech firm). 
 
Kenyan workers have a lower level even when we are talking about skilled 
workers. They still don’t measure up (CN18, Chairman, SOE, Construction). 
 
Chinese workers are like balls, if you kick them, they will run for a certain 
distance; the Kenyan ones are like a square, if you kick them, they go one 
step further, then they stop and wait (CN29, Marketing Executive, 
Pharmaceuticals).  
 
A common complaint was that Kenyans do not like working overtime, do not want to 
work on weekends, and also do not work efficiently because of their low skills and attitudes. 
Some Chinese attributed this practice to the British colonial influence which they believe did 
not instil a work ethic and concern for efficient, quality performance but instead created a 
culture in which African workers were reduced to a servile role.  
 
How can you rest on Sundays if you can’t even make ends meet? How can 
you justify it? (CN25, General Manager, SOE, Construction).  
   
One manager (CN23, Assistant General Manager, SOE, Construction) acknowledged 
that the situation did not warrant change as Kenyans have to go to church on Sunday and 
cannot be coerced to work. The business culture presented some challenges particularly for 
those in the private sector who expected incentives in order to invest as was the case in China, 
but found foreign firms did not receive preferential treatment. A number recalled that 
investment incentives were once available when Kenya actively courted FDI two decades ago, 
but these supposedly dried up over the years, creating particular challenges for Chinese SMEs. 
In contrast, managers of SOEs felt that although there were no specific incentives, subsidies 
or tax breaks, they did benefit from the favourable treatment accorded Chinese investors in 
Kenya’s ‘go East’ policy.   
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           We identified two additional yet inter-related problems which have not been 
acknowledged in the existing literature: the perceived absence of reciprocity, and the effect of 
cultural incompatibilities on trust-building. The Chinese often adopted a paternalistic 
approach whereby they believed they were ‘looking after’ workers by allowing a generous 
amount of leeway in the event of employee tardiness and inefficiency, as well as providing 
various forms of welfare benefits for employees in need. In return they expected employees 
to reciprocate by working hard, and to sacrifice their free time to work overtime when 
necessary. Paternalistic management is relatively common in Kenya (Kamoche et al., 2004b). 
Yet, when Kenyan workers failed to demonstrate the expected commitment, Chinese 
managers concluded that this form of reciprocity did not apply to Kenyan workers. Some of 
these views echo the more extreme ones expressed in an earlier era by western settlers and 
expatriate managers who complained about lazy, carefree Africans and were often racist and 
intolerant (Onyemelukwe, 1973). Researchers have sought to explain the African worker’s 
ambivalence toward the exigencies of an industrial lifestyle in terms of the deprivation of 
ownership rights, low empowerment and employee involvement which in turn undermine 
employee sense of belonging, ultimately generating a low level of commitment (e.g. Ukaegbu, 
2000; Judith, 2012). Lack of trust presented a particularly serious problem for Chinese 
investors accustomed to sealing business deals with limited formal procedures or paperwork. 
Their approach to business might be described as ‘flexibility based on trust’. According to a 
Kenyan lawyer (KN19), the failure to formalise agreements through established legal 
procedures often meant that Chinese investors sought legal help when the damage had 
already been done.  
 
Chinese invest in all sectors and they face counterfeit product problems. In 
addition, Chinese companies sometimes do not all follow laws and 
regulations and they only look for a lawyer when the problems have already 
occurred’ (KN19, Business Owner, Lawyer).   
 
A similar phenomenon has been observed in Zambia where Chinese begin to 
implement projects rapidly and only carry out research later as and when necessary (Hagland, 
2009). Asked what the government was doing to ensure job-creation by Chinese firms and to 
tackle the problem of illegal workers, a government official saw the issue in terms of poor 
communications, a view that reinforced the ambiguity surrounding official policy: 
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The Chinese do not always communicate their needs well. They have a 
language crisis, so they would rather try to let you know once they get here 
what their requirements are, but they should have done it prior to arrival. 
(KN23, Government Official). 
 
Various Kenyan managers found that Chinese investors did not always honour their 
‘flexible’ approach, when agreements were subsequently changed unilaterally, thus 
undermining trust. This was particularly noteworthy when it came to employment terms, as 
discussed below. This is attributable to the effect of culture on the way Chinese people think 
and communicate, with a ‘pictographic language’ that emphasises the big picture instead of 
exact details (Graham and Lam, 2003). Although African speech patterns have traditionally 
been characterised by anthropologists as relying on symbol, metaphor and non-verbal forms 
of communication (Gudykunst et al, 1996), urbanised Kenyan workers and managers 
appeared to expect a high degree of precision. 
 
The impact of low-cost strategies on HRM practices 
In our effort to characterise the human resource practices used by Chinese firms, one theme 
appeared dominant: their reliance on low-cost employment strategies, in particular the 
absence of advertising in recruitment, little use of formal, ‘time-consuming’ recruitment 
practices to an emphasis on low wages. Educational qualifications and previous experience 
were generally ignored at lower supervisory and ordinary employee levels, and the most 
sought-after qualities were honesty and punctuality. The rationale for informal word-of-
mouth hiring found some justification in the high unemployment rate in the country. It was 
not only the low-skilled poor workers who flocked to Chinese firms. Powerful individuals 
also saw Chinese firms in general as an opportunity to discharge family pressure obligations 
through informal networks:   
 
See, once your company starts recruiting, people with connections start 
knocking on your door … especially government officials. ‘Oh, can my 
relative come and work for you?’ That kind of thing. (CN14, Director, 
Conglomerate). 
  
The low-cost employment strategy generated several problems. In particular, a low 
wage regime (based on the perception of low skills, inefficiency and poor work ethic) does 
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not necessarily attract the best candidates, and in fact becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. It 
transpired that the educational level of many employees, especially those in construction, was 
rudimentary, which in part explains much of the stereotyping. In the majority of cases, hiring 
through word-of-mouth was based on the belief that employees would only recommend 
trustworthy friends and relatives who would feel compelled to live up to expectations if for 
no other reason than to protect the recommender. Chinese managers were quick to dispel the 
‘myth’ that they relied heavily on Chinese workers. The hiring of Chinese personnel was 
determined by the nature of the jobs: construction firms, be they private or State-owned, were 
more likely to hire relatively more technical staff including engineers, and not low-skilled 
Chinese workers. For jobs such as travel agents, it made little economic sense to hire Chinese 
with little knowledge of the local terrain, literally and business-wise. 
 
Only for specific kinds of work that we cannot find workers here would we 
bring in some from China (CN18, Chairman, SOE, Construction). 
 
On the claim that Chinese companies hire ‘cheap’ convicts and hordes of Chinese workers: 
Chinese workers can endure hardship, and are willing to endure 
hardship … the general public here recognise that Chinese people are quick 
and cheap in repairing roads, although there are people who speak against 
the Chinese companies and denigrate their image by saying that they have 
brought prisoners … I ask them, ‘where do you get your idea of “reform-
through-convicts?”’ (CN14, Director, Conglomerate). 
 
After explaining how Chinese firms price the labour and the high costs (double the 
wages, visa fees, accommodation, home passage etc.) associated with bringing workers from 
China, the investor explained: 
 
This is as clear as daylight. Even dummies can work that out. If you came 
from America to set up a factory here, would you bring American workers 
here? That’s impossible (CN14, Director, Conglomerate). 
 
The foregoing is consistent with Brautigan and Tang’s (2011:45) findings that 
contrasted with ‘popular accounts that assume Chinese projects bring in all their own 
workforce’. Our position also echoes Davies et al.’s (2008) argument that it may appear that 
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Chinese companies import manual labourers, but in reality, skilled workers are brought in to 
fill specific gaps. A more direct outcome of the low-cost employment strategy was low wages. 
Chinese managers found it difficult to understand why financial incentives offered through 
overtime and weekend work did not appeal to Kenyan workers.  
 
It was very difficult to ask them to work overtime in the beginning when we 
first built roads here. Nobody would come. Of course overtime wages are 
very high, 1.5 times on Saturdays and double for Sundays … their market 
concept has changed. Let’s say if you never show up, I would not hire you 
again … We have to follow our plans and schedules. If you cannot fit in our 
schedule, you’ll be eliminated (CN18, Chairman, SOE, Construction). 
  
The above statement typifies an aspect of Chinese culture that goes beyond ‘diligence’ 
to ‘endurance’ – chiku nailao (吃苦耐劳), and is considered to be more important than talent. 
Hard work even in the most difficult conditions is considered honourable in Chinese 
philosophy (Graham and Lam, 2003). The Chinese took the view that Kenyan workers did 
not exhibit this tenacity.  
The majority of Kenyan employees reported being unhappy with the wages relative to 
what they might have earned elsewhere.  
 
Kenyans don’t like working for Chinese. The pay is no good. Overtime is not 
attractive. They’re too mean. Even to get a Chinese to give you a tip, it’s a 
problem. They never give tips (KN2, Business Supervisor, Catering). 
 
Chinese pay well when they first come, but as they take root they tend to 
reduce the pay. That is not very good. They come as visitors and try to 
endear themselves to the locals, and over time they tend to change although 
legally they’re not allowed to do that (KN17, Sales Manager, 
Conglomerate). 
  
I am not too happy with the pay, but it’s okay for now. But I still want to 
work here. The boss is good, and sympathetic. Anyway, inasmuch as they’re 
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domineering, they give you space to exercise your discretion (KN18, Travel 
consultant, Conglomerate). 
 
The foregoing can be explained with reference to culture and cultural differences. It is 
not the Chinese practice to give tips even in restaurants. Instead, workers may receive red 
packet money, i.e. ‘hongbao’ (红包) for good performance, particular during festive seasons 
and special occasions (see Hurst, 2009). While overtime rates were not perceived by Kenyan 
workers as particularly attractive given the relatively low base-rate, this phenomenon had 
some notable implications for trust-building, from the point of view of Chinese employers, 
who appeared oblivious of the impact of a low-wage strategy.  
 
You don’t have to pay them too much. However, if you leave an amount of 
money three times as much as his salary, he will immediately grab it and 
run away …you can say that they steal because they are poor (CN25, 
General Manager, SOE, Construction). 
 
A small number of firms focused on service-delivery based on high-level expertise, 
thus demonstrating that goal-focused strategies did exist alongside low-cost employment 
strategies.  
 
The highest position of Kenyan workers is Supervisor. It is not easy for 
Kenyans to be promoted because most of them are low-skilled; however, 
there are very good Kenyan workers and these workers get paid even more 
than any other Chinese workers (CN18, Chairman, SOE, Construction).  
 
Everyone is equal in our company. There is no guanxi network here and the 
most important thing is to deliver. One can argue with me, as the CEO, but 
if he can deliver what is required, then he is right. We will forget about the 
arguments we had (CN21, CEO, High-tech firm).  
 
The forgoing illustrates the diversity of corporate culture and management styles of 
individual Chinese firms and their impact on human resource management practices.  
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The boundary-spanning role of local managers 
In spite of the rapid advances in human resource management (HRM) (e.g. Kamoche et al, 
2012), there has been relatively less attention on managers, in particular the recruitment of 
managers, the development of managerial expertise, and the role of local managers in MNCs 
from emerging economies (see Engardio, 2008; Thite et al, 2012). China’s own experience of 
industrialisation and modernisation may have vital lessons for Africa (Jackson, 2012). The 
concerns about hiring employees were also mirrored in the hiring of managers, suggesting 
that there was still an over-reliance on senior Chinese personnel while local expertise was 
available. 
 
There are guidelines about management structure. The most important 
positions are given to the owner. The others should be shared equally 
between the two, and a Kenyan should be given priority, but it’s not always 
followed (KN1, Assistant General Manager, Service). 
  
This manager explained the practice as follows: 
It is to do with trust – they might not trust locals. It is normal to offer a job 
to someone you think will not let you down (KN1, Assistant General 
Manager, Service). 
 
While local managers and supervisory staff were mostly hired through formal 
recruitment mechanisms including advertisements in the media, the informal approach 
through word-of-mouth noted above also extended to these cadres, particularly in 
engineering/construction firms.  
 
At the end of a project, engineers would recommend one another. And 
graduates of one university may recommend graduates of their university 
(CN18, Chairman, Construction). 
  
Recruiting competent managers was not as challenging as hiring competent employees, 
as the former were able to offer high educational credentials and appropriate experience. 
Retaining them, however, often proved problematic, and according to one Chinese manager 
(CN25, SOE, Construction), the challenge was to find highly-skilled professionals who desire 
paid employment as many senior engineers reportedly opted to set up their own businesses at 
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some point. One telecommunications firm gave up recruiting experienced managers and 
preferred to hire graduate trainees, including Kenyans who had studied in China or taken 
Chinese language courses at a local university, thus adding a cultural angle to the notion of 
boundary-spanning. Kenyan managers on the whole expressed satisfaction with Chinese 
firms, which largely contradicted the public’s general perception.  
 
I am happy here. The Chinese treat us well. For us here, we have a Chief 
Accountant. In the construction industry … most of the Chinese people are 
engineers, so you find they are in better positions (KN16, Office 
Coordinator, Conglomerate).   
 
Opportunities to advance are quite many as Chinese firms expand. They are 
changing the way people do business here. They have made business 
construction affordable by bringing down prices, though there are quality 
issues. In terms of how they treat people, not bad, but not 100%. I would 
give them 70%, an Indian employer 55%, a Kenyan employer 75%, and 
British 80-85% (KN17, Sales Manager, Conglomerate). 
 
 This latter manager (KN17) reported being ‘quite happy’ after five years working in a 
Chinese construction company and said he was aware of ‘many Kenyans’ in management 
positions in Chinese firms. The main challenge for local managers was a glass ceiling as the 
senior positions were generally reserved for the Chinese. This was particularly frustrating for 
managers who only discovered late into the selection process that the employer was Chinese, 
in organisations that did not use a Chinese trading name. For many, the feeling of being 
consigned to the periphery remained, even if locals could rise to senior positions such as 
Department Manager or Chief Accountant:   
 
They are not open to Kenyan engineers and do not allow them to have 
access to the computers Chinese engineers use (KN8, Manager, SOE, 
Construction).  
 
The attitude described above demonstrates both a general lack of trust and limited 
opportunities for empowerment and decision making for local managers. This 
marginalisation of local managers raises doubt about the commitment of Chinese firms to 
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foster and enhance managerial expertise. Local managers also complained about not being 
fully involved in decision-making, or having decisions over-ruled, which undermined trust. 
 
I’m proud of the fact that I developed an accounting system here. The place 
was a mess before. Anyway, I expected the MD to approve it, but he came 
up with something slightly different. He wants to feel he came up with the 
idea. He appreciates the protocols and system but wants to make the idea 
look like it’s his own (KN1, Assistant General Manager, Service). 
 
The MD’s behaviour can be interpreted as wanting his employee to give him face, i.e. 
mianzi (面子), (see Graham and Lam, 2003; Wang et al., 2005), in order to demonstrate his 
power. This resulted in bewilderment and a possible impact on morale.  
 
They change very fast. You can decide on something and the next minute 
they’ve changed it. You can make a decision today, and tomorrow it’s all 
changed (KN17, Sales Manager, Conglomerate). 
 
A key observation was that Kenyans are hired to facilitate interaction with various 
stakeholders and for their knowledge of the institutional environment, which highlights the 
significance of their boundary-spanning role in their interaction with employees, clients and 
authorities. This continues a long tradition by western firms of relying on locals to negotiate 
the institutional bureaucracy while doing little else to advance their career opportunities (e.g. 
Henley, 1977; Langdon, 1981; Kamoche, 2000).  
 
We have five to ten per cent (Kenyan managers) … they each have their own 
strengths. A local manager can communicate more easily with the local 
staff … Also, he’s more familiar with the administration of the local 
government … local administration, procedures, the different departments, 
their regulations, etc … and he knows where to find resources (CN23, 
Assistant General Manager, SOE, Construction).  
 
We Chinese don’t actually supervise Kenyans to do their work, but rather, 
we teach them. The actual supervision is done by local group leaders. The 
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middle and senior management positions are all held by the Chinese. That’s 
the general practice (CN25, General Manager, SOE, Construction). 
 
Over time, after gaining operational experience in the Kenyan market, Chinese 
managers learn the need for empowerment and trust-building if they are to depend on local 
managers. As one executive reported:  
 
As managers, we are getting more and more familiar with Kenyan 
colleagues and we trust and tolerate each other more. We have a non-
smoking policy in the company, but my colleagues tolerate me when I 
smoke … and we do empower Kenyan employees… the highest position a 
Kenyan holds here is Deputy General Manager, who has been working in 
the company for 12 years (CN21, CEO, High-tech firm).   
 
The executive saw this kind of ‘tolerance’ as the beginning of effective interpersonal 
relationships between these two parties, a view that can potentially challenge the culture of 
mistrust and misconception noted above. 
  
Implications  
This section discusses the extent to which our key research questions have been addressed by 
the findings above. We structure the discussion in terms of our three questions.  
Re-examining presumed homogeneity  
The findings suggest that the general perception of ‘China’ as a homogenous power 
controlling and driving investments needs to be treated with caution. While this argument 
might capture some of the strategic drive behind SOEs, it has little relevance for private firms 
and small proprietorships that constitute a visibly significant presence in Kenya and yet do 
not receive any direct support from China. Chinese investment is multi-faceted and multi-
voiced. It could be argued however, as one investor pointed out, that private firms and SMEs 
do benefit indirectly from the Chinese economic reforms which have resulted in Chinese 
manufacturing achieving global respectability (CN30, Marketing Executive, 
Pharmaceuticals), and from the espoused ‘go East’ policy. This is a far cry from a putative 
State-sponsored conspiracy. Evidently, the range of drivers of Chinese investments in Africa, 
with particular reference to Kenya, is not confined to asset or resource seeking as suggested 
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in some of the literature (e.g. Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013), or political intention as 
contended by Gill and Reilly (2007). In reality, the organisations see themselves as 
competitors, even more so if they are in the same industry, bidding for the same project 
contracts. At the social level, the Chinese see themselves as a community, as one of the 
interviewees commented: ‘The competition is very high… But mostly we cooperate with each 
other. We do help each other because we are all Chinese, we are a Chinese community’ 
(CN19, Administration Manager, SOE, Construction).   
The diversity of motives in turn mirrors the diversity of approaches to the management 
of people though there is much convergence particularly due to the nature of the culture from 
which the firms emanate, which in turn shapes the managers’ attitudes towards Africans. This 
argument has important implications for the range of stakeholders with an interest in Chinese 
firms, from job-seekers to prospective investment partners and policy-makers. Taking the key 
consideration into account – remuneration – from the research findings there did not seem to 
be any significant differences in the levels of remuneration. The firms in our sample 
displayed extensive diversity in management practices. These practices were underpinned by 
a drive for competitiveness in a difficult business environment in which they all struggled to 
secure contracts, market share and talent. This contrasts with Ding et al. (2007) who reasoned 
that Chinese privately-owned listed firms favour earnings boosting methods more than SOEs. 
We found no such distinction. We did find however, that privately-owned high-tech firms (as 
reported by CN21 (CEO, High-tech firm) were more prepared to empower locals, and less 
reliant on interpersonal relationships and were therefore more inclined to adopt flexibility-
orientated HRM systems in line with the findings of Chang et al. (2013).     
        Virtually all the firms were considered (by both the Chinese and Kenyans) as pursuing a 
low-wage strategy particularly in terms of the recruitment process which relied heavily on 
personal connections and word-of-mouth. This observation is in line with Peng and Luo’s 
(2000) argument that Chinese managers have a cultural propensity to rely on informal ties 
and personal connections. Prospective local investors and policy-makers would find a higher 
level of formalisation and propensity to comply with the law among SOEs and large private 
firms as opposed to SMEs which tended to rely on informal practices and trust but often 
found this did not work as well as it did in China.  
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Utilisation of local knowledge 
In terms of responses to local knowledge, an emergent body of knowledge suggests that firms 
that invest in Africa must not merely concern themselves with injecting much-needed capital 
and creating employment but should also transfer knowledge and enhance local skills and 
managerial expertise (e.g. Asiedu 2004; Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006; Kamoche and Harvey, 
2006). To this research agenda, we posit the need for MNCs to learn from the local context 
not merely for the sake of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) but also in 
order to develop practices that are more contextually valid. Yet, prior research has noted the 
prevalence of ethnocentric management practices by Western firms operating in emerging 
economies, including China (e.g. Johnson et al, 2006; Gamble, 2010; Siebers, 2012), in the 
belief that these practices are superior to whatever knowledge is available locally. The issue 
for us here is to what extent are Chinese firms basing their business and management 
practices on similar assumptions? We argue that by hiring local managers as boundary-
spanners, Chinese firms are acknowledging the imperative to seek local knowledge, 
particularly where these boundary-spanners are interacting with key stakeholders including 
policy-makers. This finding is consistent with the Kamoche and Harvey’s (2006) argument 
about the role of boundary-spanners. The challenge remains whereby managers feel 
marginalised as noted above, raising doubt about the impact of ethnocentricity. The use of 
skilled, knowledgeable local managers is, we believe, a more credible illustration of the 
utilisation of local knowledge as opposed to the use of local employees with generic skills. 
Our findings on the hiring of locals are consistent with Gu (2009), who states that once 
operations are established, the majority of the employees are hired locally. That in itself does 
not, however, guarantee utilisation of specialised local knowledge where the work is routine 
and low-skilled. At the professional level, there is much more scope to draw from local 
knowledge amongst employees in firms that de-emphasise interpersonal relationships (CN21, 
CEO, High-tech firm).   
            The practice of disregarding local knowledge or ‘ignoring laws and regulations’ 
according to a Kenyan lawyer (KN19, Business Owner, Lawyer), and seeking legal advice as 
a last resort would appear to demonstrate a belief (often unwarranted), in the effectiveness of 
their own knowledge and business practices, and ipso facto, a tendency to undervalue local 
knowledge. This is also implied in Gu (2009) who found ‘weak linkages’ between Chinese 
firms and local African firms. Moreover, the Chinese practice of relying on trust and tacit 
agreements (Chen et al., 2004) rather than only formalised procedures, while crucial for the 
effectiveness of Chinese business, may not be completely suitable in this context if trust has 
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not been established. Thus, there is a need to build trust and seek to gain a thorough 
understanding of the institutionally valid local knowledge. Similarly, a better understanding 
of Chinese culture, philosophy and management practices may provide more opportunities 
for career progression of Kenyan employees and more effective partnership between Chinese 
and Kenyan organisations.  
         We argue, however, that local knowledge should not be treated as sacrosanct, and scope 
must exist for appropriate learning to take place. It is necessary to make a distinction between 
gaining an awareness of extant norms and practices on the one hand, and actually applying 
them, on the other, especially when they involve potential illegality, such as corruption. 
Chinese firms were prepared to apply whatever practices delivered desired outcomes, which 
meant being prepared to engage in graft, or changing business and management practices, 
such as building roads at night, and changing entrepreneurial attitudes through their 
willingness and ability to invest with a high degree of flexibility. A Kenyan employee 
commented: 
 
‘We were never a 24-hour economy but slowly we are adapting to that … 
One thing about the Chinese, they are very sensitive on targets and timing. 
They know any carryover expense would be a bad thing at the end of the day. 
So, if they can get things done, why not use all means to get the things 
done?’ (KN19, Business Owner, Lawyer). 
 
Chinese were also prepared to learn, and in some cases, acknowledged the limits of 
ethnocentricity.  
 
 ‘I have learned a lot from Kenyan people, not only English language but 
also the patience they gave me particularly when I came to this country, and 
I learned from them what love is[from God], and their kindness and 
simplicity make our workplace a harmonious environment’ (CN15, Director, 
Conglomerate). 
 
Thus, while China’s pursuit of economic development involves a process of learning, 
selective adaptation and innovation due to uncertainties in each country (Lin and Wang, 
2012), there is a need to examine cross-vergence and possible hybridisation (e.g. Azolukwam 
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and Perkins, 2009; Horwitz et al., 2002), in the formulation of blended business and human 
resource practices, thus fostering mutual learning.  
Re-examining the post-colonial critique 
This theme sheds light on the extent to which the Africa-China engagement exhibits an 
economic neo-colonial character, and the suitability of post-colonial theory in this discourse. 
Africa’s experience of colonialism was one whereby Western powers did little to develop 
sustainable economies based on manufacturing and processing raw materials domestically. 
The colonial approach focused on extracting raw materials and (largely unprocessed) 
agricultural produce for European economies and consumers. Critics see a parallel with the 
Chinese extraction of oil and minerals, and in this regard this paper highlights an important 
connection between post-colonial theory and current management practices. With respect to 
construction firms undertaking major infrastructural projects, we argue that the construction 
of road networks ultimately contributes to economic sustainability and self-reliance, the 
antithesis of ‘imperialist’/neo-colonial economic subjugation. However, the reliance on 
foreign firms to drive economic growth while failing to foster managerial expertise could 
potentially undermine the portrayal of Chinese firms are a partner in Kenya’s economic 
rejuvenation.   
          As the era of colonialism and forced labour came to an end, global capitalism assumed 
a new complexion as MNCs relocated factories to lowest-cost labour zones (Childs and 
Williams, 1996), in some cases, sweatshops, leading some to view this phenomenon as a new 
form of ‘imperialism’, or neo-colonialism. Given the sheer magnitude of Chinese investments 
into Africa, it is hardly surprising that this new economic dalliance has come to be seen as a 
new manifestation of imperialist control. While we found no evidence of sweatshops, the 
low-cost strategies do little to dispel the myth of ‘low-cost imperialism’. Other scholars have 
identified serious concerns in the employment practices of Chinese firms in Kenya, e.g. 
Opondo (2009). The key concern our paper identifies is the perception of Kenyan workers, 
and to some extent managers as reflected in the choice of language used by Chinese 
managers/investors: ‘inefficient’, ‘inferior’, ‘do not measure up’, ‘backward’, ‘lacking a work 
ethic’, and so forth. This derogatory portrayal - ‘otherness’ - of Kenyan workers is consistent 
with the post-colonial depiction of the developing world as inferior to that of the coloniser. At 
the level of policy, the country appears to acquiesce in this representation of ‘backwardness’ 
by failing to challenge the attitudes and contextually inappropriate human resource practices 
31 
 
that sustain this narrative, and which include dismissing employees who refuse to work 
overtime, and marginalising managers, thus preventing knowledge transfer.   
         Post-colonial theory casts African countries, and African workers, as victims, yet it is 
too simplistic to define the Africa-China engagement in terms of a dominant power imposing 
itself on a weaker one, or foreign firms exploiting Africa. The reality becomes more complex 
if the supposedly ‘weaker’ party presents itself as a needy recipient of aid and does not 
pursue appropriate policies to protect its workers from questionable practices. When views 
consistent with this logic were expressed by Kenyans, they rang a familiar tone. In an 
example of the inability of the State to give ‘voice’ to its citizenry, a government official said: 
 
‘We have a deliberate shift from West to East which is well-documented. Aid 
from the West comes with too much baggage … if you don’t become 
democratic we won’t give you this. You almost feel as if you’re a prisoner. 
China does not impose such conditions, but also wants some kind of soft 
power. African countries realised there’s an alternative, so Africa cannot be 
an equal partner. We need technology and its transfer, trade, but so far it’s 
only one way.’ (KN23, Government Official).  
 
When the views came from Chinese, they were particularly poignant. As one investor 
(CN14, Director, Conglomerate) pointed out, the country squandered opportunities when 
many prospective investors visit Kenya but do not invest as there are no incentives or 
preferential terms, and are further discouraged by obstacles such as poor infrastructure, 
corruption, unstable exchange rates and insecurity. Comparing the general socio-economic 
situation with their own country, Chinese managers/investors saw a more insidious problem 
in the failure of public policy. The investor above (CN14, Director, Conglomerate) reported:  
 
‘The headquarters of UN-HABITAT are located in Nairobi but why are 
there still housing problems in Nairobi? Don’t you think this is a joke? 
[local investors and policy makers] … are living in luxurious houses and 
earning very high incomes’. 
 
We concur with Childs and Williams (1996) that resistance, overt or otherwise, is 
central to the post-colonial narrative. While there is much public debate about the challenge 
to Chinese business practices (some of which was based on misconceptions as noted above), 
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within the organisations in question, there was less evidence of such resistance, except in 
those cases where employees refused to work overtime or weekends. Given the high levels of 
unemployment in the country, such refusal posed a serious risk for employees. Managers 
were even less prone to resistance, and appeared prepared to tolerate their marginalisation 
and attribute it to ‘cultural differences’. In closing, we remain cognisant of the shortcomings 
of post-colonial theory not merely because of the potential flaw in characterising China’s 
engagement in Africa as ‘imperialist’, but also because post-colonial theory itself carries a 
degree of political economy baggage, having been posited as a response to Western 
colonialism. 
 
Conclusions 
Much prior research has been limited to the experience of Western firms in Africa, and has 
examined in particular the suitability of their management approaches, cultural differences, 
and the ways in which they navigate the African institutional investment environment. The 
influx of investors from the East, particularly, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and more 
recently China, has turned the continent into an opportunity for those prepared to negotiate a 
‘difficult’ investment terrain. We considered a sample of Chinese firms’ motives for 
investing in Kenya as well as the circumstances of the individual managers/investors. Our 
analysis revealed a multi-faceted reality which challenges the common view that the 
economy has come to be dominated by Chinese SOEs who employ large numbers of Chinese 
workers. This research has contributed to the literature on management in Africa with 
specific reference to the Africa-China phenomenon. It has also contributed to a better 
understanding of the suitability and relevance of post-colonial theory and thus helped to 
explain the behaviour of Chinese firms and managers in the African context. We hope this 
will engender further research on how MNCs from other parts of the world view African 
personnel, and the extent to which they utilise indigenous knowledge and develop talent in 
Africa.  
Further research might consider how the failure to give ‘voice’ to an African labour 
force and management cadres differs from the existing approaches by Western firms. This 
will lead to a better understanding of the types of incompatibilities that prevent the 
development of appropriate business and human resources practices. In light of the 
incompatibilities we found for example in mode of communication in the two supposedly 
‘high-context’ societies (Chua et al, 1987), researchers might examine Africa-China relations 
from the point of view of cross-cultural relations, conflict-resolution and social exchange 
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theory. Following Yousfi’s (2013) post-colonial account of the imposition of American 
practices, scholars might examine the extent to which hybridisation is taking place in the 
Africa-China engagement, and how the introduction of Chinese management practices is 
impacted by the experience of colonialism and the particular contextual circumstances of 
Africa. In particular, does the Africa-China engagement open up a new, alternative space for 
theorising hybridisation and the transfer of management practices? Finally, we suggest that 
the insights generated here might foster further research on the actual interaction between 
Chinese and Africans who work in teams, with a view to identifying the nature and 
determinants of knowledge-sharing.  
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Table 1 Summary of interview details (2011 – 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories  Summary statistics 
Interviewee numbers and nationality 
 Chinese 31  50% 
 Kenyan 30 48% 
 Nigerian   1  2% 
 Total  62 100% 
Language used with interviewees 
 Chinese only  11  18% 
 English only  47 76% 
 Chinese and English    4   6% 
 Total  62 100% 
Gender 
 Female 12  19% 
 Male  50  81% 
Total  62 100% 
Sectors the firms were drawn from 
Construction/engineering 8  28% 
Manufacturing  5  18% 
Catering 3  10% 
Service  3  10% 
Trading 2  7% 
Conglomerate 2  7% 
Media  2  7% 
Non-profit  2  7% 
Mining  1  3% 
Retail 1  3% 
Total  29  100% 
